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Abstract
This paper considers agglomeration economies. A new firm is planning to open a plant in a country divided
into several regions. Each firm receives a positive externality if the new plant is located in its region. In
a decentralized mechanism, the plant would be opened in the region where the new firm maximizes its
individual benefit. Due to the externalities, it could be the case that the aggregated utility of all firms is
maximized in a different region. Thus, the firms in the optimal region could transfer something to the new
firm in order to incentivize it to open the plant in that region. We propose two rules that provide two
different schemes for transfers between firms already located in the country and the newcomer. The first is
based on cooperative game theory. This rule coincides with the nucleolus and the τ -value of the associated
cooperative game. The second is defined directly. We provide axiomatic characterizations for both rules.
We characterize the core of the cooperative game. We prove that both rules belong to the core.
Keywords: game theory, core, axiomatic characterization, agglomeration economies.
1. Introduction
There are many situations where the aggregate utility obtained by a group of agents is greater when they
cooperate than when they make individual decisions. Some situations come from operations research, others
from economics, and still others from other areas. For instance there are airport games (Littlechild and
Owen, 1973), linear production problems (Owen, 1975), minimum cost spanning tree problems (Bird, 1976),
bankruptcy problems (O’Neill, 1982), transportation situations (Sanchez-Soriano, 2006), and broadcasting
sports events (Bergantin˜os and Moreno-Ternero, 2019). A major issue is how to divide the benefits of such
cooperation. Our paper fits into this literature because we study how to divide the benefits of cooperation
in an economic problem motivated by agglomeration economies.
Firms dedicated to similar activities tend to settle their plants in the same region because proximity
between them provides mutual benefits. These situations are called agglomeration economies. They have
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been widely studied in economic literature. Marshall (1920) provides the first analysis on this theory. He
states that benefits of firms from agglomeration come from three main sources: Input sharing, labor market
pooling, and knowledge spillovers. There is also a large body of empirical literature measuring the relative
importance of different agglomeration theories (see, for instance, Rosenthal and Strange, 2003 and Ellison
et al., 2010).
In this paper, we consider that a firm is planning to open a new plant in a country divided into different
regions where the plant could be opened. There are also a finite number of firms already located in these
regions. The new plant generates agglomeration economies for all of them. This means that the firms in the
region where the plant is opened receive a positive externality.
In a decentralized mechanism, the plant would be located in the most profitable region for the new firm,
say k. However, if the new firm is located in a different region, say k∗, the aggregated utility of all firms
in region k∗ and the new firm could be greater than the aggregated utility of all firms in region k and the
new firm. This is because the new firm could create more positive externalities in region k∗ than in region
k. Then, it makes sense for firms in region k∗ to transfer something to the new firm in order to incentivize
it to locate its plant in region k∗ instead of region k. The question is what transfers should be made or,
equivalently, how the aggregated utility generated when the new plant is located in region k∗ should be
divided up.
An indirect approach for answering this question is the following: First, associate a cooperative game
with transferable utility to the situation. Second, compute a solution in the associated cooperative game.
This indirect approach has been taken quite often in the literature. In airport games, Littlechild and Owen
(1973) study the Shapley value and Littlechild (1974) studies the nucleolus. In linear production games Owen
(1975) studies the core. In minimum cost spanning tree problems, Bird (1976) studies the core, Granot and
Huberman (1984) study the nucleolus, and Kar (2002) studies the Shapley value. In bankruptcy problems
O’Neill (1982) studies the Shapley value, Aumann and Maschler (1985) study the nucleolus, and Curiel
et al. (1987) study the τ -value. In transportation situations Sanchez-Soriano (2006) studies the core. In
broadcasting sport events Bergantin˜os and Moreno-Ternero (2019) study the core and the Shapley value.
Several reasonable ways can be found of associating a cooperative game with a given arbitrary problem.
For instance, in minimum cost spanning tree problems, Bird (1976) gives one way and Bergantin˜os and Vidal-
Puga (2007) give several options. In this paper we associate a cooperative game with each agglomeration
problem as follows: In some countries, e.g. Spain, regional governments can incentivize firms to locate their
plants in their territories. The usual way is to offer a subsidy to the firm for opening a new plant. Of course
such subsidies come from the budget of the regional government, which in turn comes from the taxes paid
by the economic agents in the region (which include other firms in the region). Thus, there is some transfer
between the firms in the region and the firm opening the plant there. We think that the best way to model
this situation is to consider that the coalitions that can share their benefits are those formed by the firm
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opening the plant and all firms in a given region.
We study several solution concepts for the cooperative game. The core is non-empty and can be described
as follows: The new firm receives at least the aggregated utility (of all existing firms plus the new firm) when
the new firm locates in the second best region. The difference between the aggregated utility of the best
region and the second best region is divided among the new firm and the firms in the best region. Firms
outside the best region receive 0.
The nucleolus and the τ -value coincide. We call this the egalitarian optimal location rule. The Shapley
value also coincides with this rule in a subset of agglomeration problems. The egalitarian optimal location
rule is the allocation of the core where the difference between the aggregated utility of the best region and
that of the second best region is divided equally among the new firm and the firms of the best region. This
rule has a problem because it allows some firms in the best region to receive transfers from other firms in
the same region. We find this counterintuitive. Transfers should go from the firms in the best region to the
new firm.
We also consider a rule, called the weighted optimal location rule, which is not defined through the
associated cooperative game. This rule is defined as follows: The new firm receives the aggregated utility
(of all existing firms plus the new firm) when the new firm locates in the second best region. The difference
between the aggregated utility of the best and second best regions is divided among the firms located in the
best region proportionally to the individual benefits generated for the firms by the location of the new firm.
Firms outside the best region receive 0. In this case firms in the best region make transfers to the new firm
and do not receive transfers from other firms.
Finally, we provide axiomatic characterizations of both rules. The egalitarian optimal location rule is
characterized by core selection (the rule should select core allocations) and equal treatment inside optimal
regions (if the aggregated utility of the best region increases, then all firms in that region and the new firm
should improve by the same quantity).
We characterize the set of rules satisfying core selection and merging-splitting proofness (if one firm
splits, the allocation to the rest of the firms does not change). This set of rules can be described as follows:
The new firm receives the aggregated utility of the second best region for sure. Moreover, the new firm also
receives an extra transfer from firms in the best region. The transfer from each firm located in the best
region is proportional to the benefits of the firm. The weighted optimal location rule is a rule satisfying the
two properties above that minimizes the transfer received by the new firm.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formally introduces the problem and the rules.
Section 3 associates a cooperative game with any agglomeration problem. Section 4 examines several coop-
erative solutions. Section 5 presents axiomatic characterizations of the rules, and Section 6 concludes.
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2. The agglomeration problem
We introduce the formal model for studying the situations described in the introduction.
2.1. The model
An agglomeration problem (or simply, a “problem”) is a tuple A = (0, N, P, b) where
• 0 is the firm which will open a plant in the country.
• N = {1, ..., n} is the set of firms already located in the country. We denote by N0 = N ∪ {0}.
• P = {P1, ..., Pr} is a partition of N , where R = {1, ..., r} is the set of regions in the country. Pk
denotes the set of firms located in region k.
• b =
{
bki : i ∈ N0 and k ∈ R
}
. bki ≥ 0 denotes the benefit obtained by firm i when 0 locates its plant in
region k.
We assume that if an existing firm is outside the region where the new plant is located it does not obtain
any (significant) benefit. Thus, for all k ∈ R and all i /∈ Pk, b
k
i = 0. There are no further assumptions about
P . So there may be a region with no firms located in it, i.e., Pk = ∅.
We now introduce some concepts and notation used throughout the paper.
For each i ∈ N , k(i) ∈ R denotes the region where firm i is located, i.e., i ∈ Pk(i). For all S ⊆ N0, U(S)
denotes the firms in regions contained in S. This is,
U(S) = {i ∈ S : Pk(i) ⊆ S}.
In a decentralized mechanism, firm 0 would locate its new plant in the region where the firm optimizes
its individual benefit. Namely in
argmax
k∈R
{
bk0
}
.
Nevertheless, the aggregated benefit could be greater if the location was different, so it makes sense to
locate the new plant maximizing the global benefit and then provide a compensation scheme. Thus, firm 0
gets more than in the decentralized mechanism and the other firms are not worse off.
Formally, we define the global benefit of any problem A as
g(A) = max
k∈R
{∑
i∈N0
bki
}
.
For each region k ∈ R, the benefit obtained by all firms in N0 when the plant is located in region k is
given by ∑
i∈N0
bki =
∑
i∈Pk∪{0}
bki .
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Given a problem A we say that k∗ is an optimal region if locating firm 0 in region k∗ results in the
maximum global benefit. Namely for each Pk ∈ P ,
∑
i∈Pk∗∪{0}
bk
∗
i ≥
∑
i∈Pk∪{0}
bki .
Obviously, k∗ may be not unique and g(A) =
∑
i∈Pk∗∪{0}
bk
∗
i for each optimal region k
∗.
For every problem A, we now define s(A) as the global benefit obtained by all firms in N0 when the
plant is located in the second best region. Formally, given an optimal region k∗
s(A) = max
k∈R\{k∗}


∑
i∈Pk∪{0}
bki

 .
Although this definition could depend on the chosen k∗, it does not. When there are several optimal
regions, s(A) = g(A). Otherwise, s(A) < g(A).
We now define I0(A) as the maximum between the individual benefit of firm 0 when it locates in an
optimal region k∗ and the benefit obtained by all firms when 0 locates in the second best region. Then,
I0(A) = max
k∈R


∑
i∈N0\Pk∗
bki

 = max
{
bk
∗
0 , s(A)
}
.
Notice that I0(A) is the maximum utility that can be obtained without cooperating with firms in region
k∗.
For each optimal region k∗ we have that
bk
∗
0 ≤
∑
i∈Pk∗∪{0}
bk
∗
i = g(A).
When there are several optimal regions, s(A) = g(A) and hence I0(A) = g(A). Thus, I0(A) does not
depend on the k∗ chosen.
2.2. Rules
In this section we propose two rules: the egalitarian optimal location rule and the weighted optimal
location rule.
A rule is a way of dividing the global benefit among the set of all firms, i.e., a function f assigning to
each problem A a vector in RN0 that satisfies
∑
i∈N0
fi(A) = g(A).
For each problem A, let k∗ be an optimal region and let |Pk∗ | denote the number of firms in region k
∗.
The egalitarian optimal location rule (EOL), for each i ∈ N0, is defined as
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EOLi(A) =


I0(A) +
g(A)− I0 (A)
|Pk∗ |+ 1
, if i = 0
g(A)− I0 (A)
|Pk∗ |+ 1
, if i ∈ Pk∗
0, otherwise.
This rule has a nice interpretation. Firm 0 receives I0(A) for sure. Moreover, the surplus generated
(with respect to I0(A)) by Pk∗ and 0 is divided equally among all firms generating that surplus. Firms
outside the optimal region get zero. Below, we prove that the EOL rule can be obtained as a solution of a
cooperative game.
Notice that when A has several optimal regions, EOL0(A) = g(A) and EOLi(A) = 0 for all i ∈ N .
We think that this rule could assign “too much” to some firms. Consider the following example.
Example 1. Let N = {1, 2, 3}, P = {{1}, {2, 3}}, b10 = 6, b
1
1 = 2, b
2
0 = 5, b
2
2 = 1 and b
2
3 = 8.
The optimal region is P2 = {2, 3}, g(A) = 14 and I0(A) = 8. Now EOL(A) = (10, 0, 2, 2).
The interpretation of this allocation is the following. To attract firm 0 to region 2, firms in that region
must transfer something to firm 0. Thus it seems reasonable for firm 0 get 10. However, firm 2 gets 2, more
than its individual benefit when firm 0 locates in region 2. Instead of transferring something to firm 0, firm
2 receives a transfer of 1 unit from firm 3. We do not find this very intuitive.
We now introduce a rule called the weighted optimal location rule (WOL), which avoids the problem
mentioned for the EOL rule. The idea is simple: Firm 0 receives I0(A). If firm 0 receives I0(A) for locating
in k∗, then it is known for sure that no region can offer firm 0 more than I0(A). The surplus generated
when firm 0 locates in region k∗, g(A)− I0(A), is divided among the firms in region k
∗ proportionally to b.
Formally, for each i ∈ N0,
WOLi(A) =


I0(A), if i = 0
bk
∗
i∑
j∈Pk∗
bk
∗
j
(g(A)− I0(A)), if i ∈ Pk∗
0, otherwise.
Notice that there are two main differences between the egalitarian optimal location rule and the weighted
optimal location rule. In EOL, g(A)− I0(A) is divided equally among all firms in Pk∗ and firm 0. While in
WOL, g(A)− I0(A) is divided only among firms in Pk∗ and not equally but proportionally to b.
In Example 1 WOL(A) = (8, 0, 0.67, 5.33). In this case both firms in the optimal region transfer some-
thing to firm 0. We find this reasonable.
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3. The cooperative game
In this section we approach the agglomeration problem as a cooperative game with transferable utility
and study some properties of that game.
We first review some well-known definitions of cooperative games. Later we introduce a cooperative
game modeling an agglomeration problem.
3.1. Basic notions of cooperative games
We now introduce cooperative games with transferable utility and some solutions such as the core, the
nucleolus, the τ -value, and the Shapley value.
A cooperative game with transferable utility (TU game) is a pair (N, v) where N ⊂ N is the finite
set of players and v : 2N → R with v(∅) = 0 is the characteristic function. For any coalition S ⊆ N , v(S)
represents the amount that the members of coalition S can obtain if they cooperate. When no confusion
arises, we refer to v as a game.
An allocation x ∈ RN is an imputation in v if
∑
i∈N
xi = v(N) and xi ≥ v({i}), for all i ∈ N . The set of
all imputations for a game v is denoted by I(v).
The core of v is
C(v) =
{
x ∈ I(v) :
∑
i∈S
xi ≥ v(S), for all S ⊆ N
}
.
We now present three single-value solutions of TU games: the nucleolus (Schmeidler, 1969), the τ -value
(Tijs, 1981), and the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953).
The excess of S ⊆ N with respect to any x ∈ I(v) is defined as
e(S, x) = v(S)−
∑
i∈S
xi.
This number can be interpreted as the degree of dissatisfaction of coalition S when imputation x is realized.
For each x ∈ I(v), let θ(x) ∈ R2
n
be the vector of all excesses e(S, x) arranged in non-increasing order,
i.e., θi(x) ≥ θi+1(x) for all i ∈ {1, ..., 2
n − 1}.
For any x, y ∈ I(v), x is more acceptable than y (and write x ≻ y) if there is an integer 1 ≤ j ≤ 2n such
that θi(x) = θi(y) if 1 ≤ i < j and θj(x) < θj(y).
The nucleolus of v is the set
η(v) = {x ∈ I(v) : x  y, ∀y ∈ I(v)}.
The nucleolus consists of those imputations which are such that there is no more acceptable alternative. In
other words, the nucleolus recursively minimizes the dissatisfaction of the worst treated coalitions.
It is well known that the nucleolus is always non-empty and it contains a unique allocation. Furthermore,
if the game has a non-empty core, the nucleolus belongs to the core.
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For any v and every i ∈ N , let Mi(v) be player i’s marginal contribution to the grand coalition, i.e.,
Mi(v) = v(N)− v(N\{i}).
The vector M(v) = (Mi(v))i∈N is called the utopia vector of v.
The minimum right vector is m(v) = (mi(v))i∈N , where mi(v) is the greatest possible remainder for
player i of v(S) after every other player in the coalition obtains their utopia payoff. Formally, for all i ∈ N
mi(v) = max
S⊂N :i∈S

v(S)−
∑
j∈S\{i}
Mj(v)

 .
The core cover of v consists of the set of allocations that gives each player at least their minimum right
and at most their utopia point. Namely,
CC(v) =
{
x ∈ Rn :
∑
i∈N
xi = v(N),m(v) ≤ x ≤M(v)
}
.
When the core cover is non-empty, the τ-value is defined as
τ(v) = αM(v) + (1− α)m(v)
with α ∈ [0, 1] such that
∑
i∈N
τi(v) = v(N).
Let ΠN be the set of all permutations of the finite set N ⊂ N. Given π ∈ ΠN , let Pre(i, π) denote the
set of elements of N which come before i in the order given by π, i.e. Pre(i, π) = {j ∈ N |π(j) < π(i)}.
The Shapley value of v is defined for all i ∈ N as the average of the marginal contribution of agent i
over the set of all permutations. Namely,
Shi(v) =
1
|N |!
∑
π∈ΠN
(v(Pre(i, π) ∪ {i})− v(Pre(i, π))).
Finally, we introduce some standard properties of TU games. We say that v is:
• Monotone if v(S) ≤ v(T ) whenever S ⊆ T , for all S, T ⊆ N .
• Superadditive if for S, T ⊆ N with S ∩ T = ∅, v(S ∪ T ) ≥ v(S) + v(T ).
• Convex if v(S ∪ {i})− (S) ≥ v(T ∪ {i})− v(T ), ∀ T ⊆ S ⊆ N\{i}, ∀ i ∈ N .
Monotonicity states that the worth of a coalition increases as more players join it. Superadditivity says
that it is more profitable for two disjoint coalitions to merge. In a convex game, the marginal contribution
of a player is monotone with respect to the size of the coalition that they join.
3.2. The agglomeration game
We associate a cooperative game vA with each agglomeration problem A. We also study some basic
properties of that cooperative game.
We now define the cooperative vA under the assumption that benefits can only be shared between firm
0 and all firms in region k. Then, for any problem A and every S ⊆ N0 the agglomeration game v
A can
be defined as
vA(S) =


max
k∈R
{
bk0 +
∑
i∈U(S)
bki
}
, if 0 ∈ S
0, otherwise.
Notice that vA(N0) = g(A). We compute v
A in Example 1.
Example 1 (continuation). The table below shows the worth of coalitions S ⊆ N0, with 0 ∈ S according
to vA:
S {0} {0, 1} {0, 2} {0, 3} {0, 1, 2} {0, 1, 3} {0, 2, 3} N0
vA(S) 6 8 6 6 8 8 14 14
Notice that, for example, the worth of coalition {0, 3} is 6, although the aggregated benefit is b20+b
2
3 = 13.
Since firm 2 is also located in region 2 and is not in the coalition, firm 0 would locate its new plant in region
1, the most profitable region for 0.
In the proposition below we discuss the properties satisfied by vA.
Proposition 1. vA is monotone and superadditive but not convex.
Proof. Let S ⊆ T ⊆ N0. Since U(S) ⊆ U(T ) it can be deduced that v
A(S) ≤ vA(T ) and hence vA is
monotone.
Let S, T ⊆ N0 with S∩T = ∅. Consider two cases. First, 0 /∈ S∪T . Then v
A(S) = vA(T ) = vA(S∪T ) = 0
and vA(S∪T ) ≥ vA(S)+vA(T ). Second, 0 ∈ S∪T . Assume that 0 ∈ S (the case 0 ∈ T is similar so we omit
it). Since vA is monotone, vA(S) ≤ vA(S ∪T ). Since 0 /∈ T , vA(T ) = 0. Then vA(S ∪T ) ≥ vA(S)+ vA(T ).
Hence vA is superadditive.
We now prove that vA may not be convex. Take i = 1, S = {0, 2} and T = {0, 2, 3} in Example 1. Since
vA(S ∪ {i}) − vA(S) = 8 − 6 = 2 > vA(T ∪ {i}) − vA(T ) = 14 − 14 = 0, it can be deduced that vA is not
convex.
In the next claim we state some obvious links between I0(A) and v
A that we then use in the proofs of
our results.
Claim 1. For any problem A and each S ⊆ N0 with 0 ∈ S, the following statements hold
1. I0(A) ≥ v
A(S) when Pk∗ * S.
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2. I0(A) ≤ v
A(S) when Pk∗ ⊆ S.
3. I0(A) = v
A(N0\{i}), for any i ∈ Pk∗ .
4. I0(A) = max
k∈R\{k∗}
{vA(Pk ∪ {0})}.
Now we discuss some links between vA and other classes of games in the literature. Big boss games
were introduced in Muto et al. (1988). A game v is a big boss game with a powerful player i∗ ∈ N
if it satisfies the following three conditions: (B1) v is monotone; (B2) v(S) = 0 if i∗ /∈ S; and (B3)
v(N)− v(S) ≥
∑
i∈N\S
[v(N)− v(N\{i})]. Bahel (2016) extends the family of big boss games considering all
games that satisfy (B1) and (B2) but not (B3) and calls this family generalized big boss games or veto
games.
vA is not a big boss game but it is a generalized big boss game. It is also easy to see that for any problem
A with |Pk∗ | = 1, v
A is a big boss game.
4. Solutions of the agglomeration game
In this section we study the core, the nucleolus, the τ -value, and the Shapley value of the agglomeration
game vA.
4.1. The core
We prove that the core of vA is always non-empty. It can be described as follows: Firm 0 receives
something between I0(A) and g(A). Firms in the optimal region k
∗ receive something between zero and
g(A)− I0(A). Firms in other regions receive zero.
Theorem 1. Given a problem A and an optimal region k∗, the core of the game vA is non-empty and is
given by
C(vA) =


x ∈ Rn+1 :
∑
i∈N0
xi = g(A),
I0(A) ≤ x0 ≤ g(A),
0 ≤ xi ≤ g(A)− I0(A), ∀i ∈ Pk∗ ,
xi = 0, ∀i ∈ N\Pk∗


.
Proof. First, we prove “ ⊆ ”. Let x ∈ C(vA). Then,
∑
i∈N0
xi = v
A(N0) = g(A).
Take i ∈ N . Since vA({i}) = 0, xi ≥ 0 holds. Moreover, since
∑
j∈N0\{i}
xj ≥ v
A(N0\{i}),
xi = v
A(N0)−
∑
j∈N0\{i}
xj ≤ g(A)− v
A(N0\{i}).
Consider two cases:
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• i /∈ Pk∗ . Notice that b
k∗
j = 0, for all j ∈ Pk(i) and U(N0\{i}) = N\Pk(i). Thus,
vA(N0\{i}) = max
k∈R


∑
j∈N0\Pk(i)
bkj

 =
∑
j∈N0\Pk(i)
bk
∗
j =
∑
j∈N0
bk
∗
j = g(A).
Hence, xi = 0.
• i ∈ Pk∗ . By Claim 1.3, v
A(N0\{i}) = I0(A). Then, 0 ≤ xi ≤ g(A)− I0(A).
We now prove that x0 ≥ I0(A). If I0(A) = b
k∗
0 , x0 ≥ v
A({0}) = bk
∗
0 = I0(A).
If I0(A) = s(A), then there exists ℓ ∈ R\{k
∗} such that
x0 = x0 +
∑
i∈Pℓ
xi ≥ v({0} ∪ Pℓ) = b
ℓ
0 +
∑
i∈Pℓ
bℓi = I0(A).
Finally, we prove that x0 ≤ g(A).
x0 = v
A(N0)−
∑
i∈N
xi ≤ g(A)− v
A(N) = g(A).
We now prove “ ⊇ ”. It suffices to prove that
∑
i∈S
xi ≥ v
A(S), for all S ⊆ N0.
If 0 /∈ S,
∑
i∈S
xi ≥ 0 = v
A(S). Now, assume that 0 ∈ S. Since xi = 0 when i /∈ Pk∗ , we have that
∑
i∈S
xi = x0 +
∑
i∈S∩Pk∗
xi.
Again, we face two cases:
• Pk∗ ⊆ S. Then, ∑
i∈S
xi = v
A(N0) = v
A(S).
• Pk∗ * S. Then, ∑
i∈S
xi ≥ I0(A) +
∑
i∈S∩Pk∗
xi ≥ I0(A).
By Claim 1.1 I0(A) ≥ v
A(S).
As a consequence of this theorem if k∗ is not unique, the core consists of a single element in which firm 0
gets the total worth of the grand coalition and the all other firms get zero. The same happens when Pk∗ = ∅
or if bk
∗
i = 0 for all i ∈ Pk∗ .
Taking into account the expression of the core, it is straightforward to check that both EOL and WOL
belong to the core of vA.
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4.2. The nucleolus
We now prove that the nucleolus of the game vA coincides with the egalitarian optimal location rule.
Theorem 2. For each problem A, η(vA) = EOL(A).
Proof. Let k∗ be an optimal region. Assume first that k∗ is not unique. Then EOL(A) = (g(A), 0, ..., 0).
Since the core consist of a single element (g(A), 0, ..., 0), the nucleolus coincides with that element. Therefore,
η(vA) = EOL(A).
We now assume that k∗ is unique. Take S ⊆ N0. We compute e(S, x) where x = EOL(A). We consider
several cases:
(i) 0 /∈ S and S ∩ Pk∗ = ∅. Then,
e(S, x) = vA(S)−
∑
i∈S
xi = 0− 0 = 0.
(ii) 0 /∈ S and S ∩ Pk∗ 6= ∅. Then,
e(S, x) =vA(S)−
∑
i∈S
xi = 0− |S ∩ Pk∗ |
g(A)− I0(A)
|Pk∗ |+ 1
≤−
(
g(A)− I0(A)
|Pk∗ |+ 1
)
.
(iii) 0 ∈ S and S ∩ Pk∗ = Pk∗ . Then,
e(S, x) = vA(S)−
∑
i∈S
xi = g(A)− x0 −
∑
i∈Pk∗
xi = g(A)− g(A) = 0.
(iv) 0 ∈ S and S ∩ Pk∗ 6= Pk∗ . By Claim 1.1, v
A(S) ≤ I0(A). Then,
e(S, x) =vA(S)−
∑
i∈S
xi = v
A(S)− x0 −
∑
i∈S∩Pk∗
xi
≤I0(A)−
(
I0(A) +
g(A)− I0(A)
|Pk∗ |+ 1
)
− |S ∩ Pk∗ |
(
g(A)− I0(A)
|Pk∗ |+ 1
)
=− (|S ∩ Pk∗ |+ 1)
(
g(A)− I0(A)
|Pk∗ |+ 1
)
≤ −
(
g(A)− I0(A)
|Pk∗ |+ 1
)
.
Thus, θ(x) can be expressed as
θ(x) = (0, ..., 0, e(S1, x), e(S2, x), ...)
where the 0, ..., 0 corresponds to cases (i) and (iii) and e(S1, x), e(S2, x), ... corresponds to cases (ii) or (iv).
It has already been shown above that for all Sh,
e(Sh, x) ≤ −
(
g(A)− I0(A)
|Pk∗ |+ 1
)
.
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In order to prove that x is the nucleolus it suffices to prove that x is more acceptable than any other
element in the core.
Let y ∈ C(vA). It is easy to see that for cases (i) and (iii), e(S, y) = 0. Thus, θ(y) can be expressed as
θ(y) = (0, ..., 0, e(T 1, y), e(T 2, y), ...)
where the 0, ..., 0 corresponds to cases (i) and (iii) and e(T 1, y), e(T 2, y), ... corresponds to cases (ii) or (iv).
Now, it suffices to prove that there is S in cases (ii) or (iv) satisfying that
e(S, y) > −
(
g(A)− I0(A)
|Pk∗ |+ 1
)
.
Consider two cases:
• y0 < x0. Let S = N0\Pk∗ ,
e(S, y) = vA(N0\Pk∗)−
∑
i∈N0\Pk∗
yi = I0(A)− y0 > I0(A)− x0 = −
(
g(A)− I0(A)
|Pk∗ |+ 1
)
.
• y0 ≥ x0. Then, there is i ∈ Pk∗ such that yi < xi. If we take S = {i},
e(S, y) = vA({i})− yi > 0− xi = −
(
g(A)− I0(A)
|Pk∗ |+ 1
)
.
In general, the computation of the nucleolus is NP hard. As a consequence of Theorem 2, in agglomer-
ation games η can be computed in polynomial time.
4.3. The τ-value
We now prove that the τ -value of the game vA coincides with the egalitarian optimal location rule.
Theorem 3. For each problem A, τ(vA) = EOL(A).
Proof. Let k∗ be an optimal region. Assume first that k∗ is not unique. Thus, vA(N0\{0}) = 0 and for all
i ∈ N , vA(N0\{i}) = g(A). Hence, τ(v
A) = EOL(A).
We now consider the case when k∗ is unique. Since for all S ⊇ Pk∗∪{0}, v
A(S) = vA(N0), v
A(N0\{0}) =
0, and for all i ∈ Pk∗ v
A(N0\{i}) = I0(A), it can be deduced that
Mi(v
A) =


g(A), if i = 0
g(A)− I0(A), if i ∈ Pk∗
0, otherwise.
Let i ∈ N and S ⊆ N0 with i ∈ S. If 0 /∈ S, then v
A(S) = 0. Since Mj(v
A) ≥ 0 for all j ∈ N0,
vA(S)−
∑
j∈S\{i}
Mi(v
A) ≤ 0.
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Assume that 0 ∈ S. Since M0(v
A) = g(A) and g(A) = vA(N0) ≥ v
A(S),
vA(S)−
∑
j∈S\{i}
Mi(v
A) ≤ g(A)− g(A)−
∑
j∈S\{i,0}
Mi(v
A) ≤ 0.
Moreover, for S = {i},
vA(S)−
∑
j∈S\{i}
Mi(v
A) = 0.
Therefore, mi(v
A) = 0, for all i ∈ N .
Let S ⊆ N0 with 0 ∈ S. If Pk∗ * S, by Claim 1.1,
vA(S)−
∑
j∈S\{0}
Mj(v
A) ≤ vA(S) ≤ I0(A).
Now, assume that Pk∗ ⊆ S. Thus,
vA(S)−
∑
j∈S\{0}
Mj(v
A) =vA(N0)−
∑
j∈Pk∗
Mj(v
A)
=g(A)− |Pk∗ |(g(A)− I0(A))
≤g(A)− (g(A)− I0(A)) = I0(A).
If I0(A) = b
k∗
0 , take S = {0}. Then,
vA(S)−
∑
j∈S\{0}
Mj(v
A) = bk
∗
0 = I0(A).
If I0(A) 6= b
k∗
0 , take S = Pℓ ∪ {0} where ℓ ∈ R\{k
∗} is such that I0(A) = v
A(Pℓ ∪ {0}). Then,
vA(S)−
∑
j∈S\{0}
Mj(v
A) = vA(Pℓ ∪ {0}) = I0(A).
Then, m0(v
A) = I0(A).
We know that τ(vA) = αM(vA) + (1− α)m(vA) where α ∈ [0, 1] and
∑
i∈N0
τi(v
A) = vA(N0) = g(A).
Thus,
g(A) =α
∑
i∈N0
Mi(v
A) + (1− α)
∑
i∈N0
mi(v
A)
=α(g(A) + |Pk∗ |(g(A)− I0(A))) + (1− α)I0(A)
=α(g(A) + |Pk∗ |g(A)− |Pk∗ |I0(A)− I0(A)) + I0(A)
=α(|Pk∗ |+ 1)(g(A)− I0(A)) + I0(A).
Therefore,
α(|Pk∗ |+ 1)(g(A)− I0(A)) = g(A)− I0(A)⇒ α =
1
|Pk∗ |+ 1
.
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Let i ∈ N . If i /∈ Pk∗ , mi(v
A) =Mi(v
A) = 0 and τi(v
A) = 0. If i ∈ Pk,
τi(v
A) = αMi(v
A) + (1− α)mi(v
A) =
g(A)− I0(A)
|Pk∗ |+ 1
.
Moreover,
τ0(v
A) =αM0(v
A) + (1− α)m0(v
A) =
g(A)
|Pk∗ |+ 1
+
|Pk∗ |
|Pk∗ |+ 1
I0(A)
=
|Pk∗ |I0(A) + I0(A) + g(A)− I0(A)
|Pk∗ |+ 1
= I0(A) +
g(A)− I0(A)
|Pk∗ |+ 1
.
Thus, τ(vA) = EOL(A).
In general, the computation of the τ -value is NP hard. As a consequence of Theorem 3, in agglomeration
games τ can be computed in polynomial time.
4.4. The Shapley value
The Shapley value is the most popular single value solution for cooperative games. It is well known
that, in non-convex games the Shapley value can lie outside the core. Moreover, the computation of this
allocation is NP hard.
Our feeling is that the allocation obtained through the Shapley value does not work very well in agglom-
eration games. In Example 1 the Shapley value is (9.17, 0.5, 2.17, 2.17). Note that this allocation is outside
the core because firm 1, which is not located in the optimal region, gets a positive amount. Moreover, firm
2 receives more than b22. As argued above for EOL, we do not find this very reasonable.
Since the Shapley value can lie outside the core, firms in the optimal region can transfer money to
firms outside the optimal region. This is quite difficult to imagine in the situation that we are considering.
Furthermore, we so not have a closed expression for the Shapley value for any agglomeration problem. This
makes it impossible to compute Sh in polynomial time.
Nevertheless, in agglomeration problems where I0(A) = b
k∗
0 , the Shapley value coincides with the egali-
tarian optimal location rule. The next theorem formally states this result.
Theorem 4. For any problem A such that I0(A) = b
k∗
0 , Sh(v
A) = EOL(A).
Proof. Let k∗ be an optimal region. Assume that k∗ is not unique. It is known that EOL(A) = (g(A), 0, ..., 0).
Since I0(A) = b
k∗
0 and k
∗ is not unique it can be deduced that I0(A) = g(A). Then, for all S ⊆ N0
vA(S) =

 g(A), if 0 ∈ S0, otherwise.
For any S ⊆ N0 such that 0 /∈ S, v
A(S ∪ {0})− vA(S) = g(A). Then, Sh0(v
A) = g(A).
For any i ∈ N and any S ⊆ N0 such that i /∈ S, v
A(S ∪{i}) = vA(S). Then, Shi(v
A) = 0 for any i ∈ N .
Therefore, Sh(vA) = EOL(A).
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We now consider that k∗ is unique. Then, for all S ⊆ N0
vA(S) =


g(A), if 0 ∈ S and Pk∗ ⊆ S
I0(A), if 0 ∈ S and Pk∗ * S
0, otherwise.
Take i ∈ N\Pk∗ and S ⊆ N0 with i /∈ S. Then v
A(S ∪ {i}) = vA(S). Therefore, Shi(v
A) = 0,
∀i ∈ N\Pk∗ .
Take i ∈ Pk∗ and let S ⊆ N0 with i /∈ S.
vA(S ∪ {i})− vA(S) =

 g(A)− I0(A), if Pk∗ ∪ {0} ⊆ S ∪ {i}0, otherwise.
Let Π′ be the subset of ΠN0 given by the permutations π where i is the last element of Pk∗ ∪ {0} in π.
Thus,
Shi(v) =
1
|N0|!
∑
π∈ΠN0
(v(Pre(i, π) ∪ {i})− v(Pre(i, π)))
=
1
|N0|!
∑
π∈Π′
(g(A)− I0(A))
=
|Π′|
|N0|!
(g(A)− I0(A)).
Since 1 in |Pk∗ |+ 1 permutations in ΠN0 belongs to Π
′ it can be deduced that
Shi(v) =
g(A)− I0(A)
|Pk∗ |+ 1
, ∀i ∈ Pk∗ .
Finally,
Sh0(v
A) =g(A)−
∑
i∈N
Shi(v
A)
=g(A)−
|Pk∗ |(g(A)− I0(A))
|Pk∗ |+ 1
=I0(A) +
g(A)− I0(A)
|Pk∗ |+ 1
.
Therefore, Sh(vA) = EOL(A).
5. Axiomatic characterizations
In this section we introduce some properties of rules. We analyze which of those properties are fulfilled by
the egalitarian optimal location rule and the weighted optimal location rule. Finally, we present axiomatic
characterizations for both rules.
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Core selection says that the rule should select core allocations.
Core selection (CS): For any problem A, f(A) ∈ C(vA).
Monotonicity says that if the individual benefit of a firm increases (and the rest of the problem remains
the same), then that firm should not end up worse off.
Monotonicity (M): For any two problems A = (0, N, P, b) and A′ = (0, N, P, b′) such that b′ki > b
k
i for
some i ∈ N0 and k ∈ R and b
′ℓ
j = b
ℓ
j otherwise, fi(A
′) ≥ fi(A).
Consider two firms belonging to the same region that obtain the same benefit when 0 opens the new
plant in their region. Symmetry says that they should receive the same amount.
Symmetry (SYM): For any problem A and each pair of firms i, j ∈ Pk such that b
k
i = b
k
j , fi(A) = fj(A).
Assume that firm 0 locates in region k∗. Thus it would be desirable to have rules where firms in Pk∗
transfer something to firm 0 in order to incentivize firm 0 to locate in region k∗.
Let k∗ be an optimal region. For each i ∈ N0, define t
f (A), the transfer vector associated to rule f ,
as tfi (A) = b
k∗
i − fi(A).
The next property says that firms in Pk∗ should transfer something, but they cannot receive transfers.
No transfer to local firms (NTLF ): For any problem A, each optimal region k∗ and each i ∈ Pk∗ we
have that tfi (A) ≥ 0.
Equal treatment inside optimal regions says that if the value of an optimal region increases (and the rest
of the problem remains the same), then all firms in that region and firm 0 are affected in the same amount.
Equal treatment inside optimal regions (ETOR): Let A = (0, N, P, b) and A′ = (0, N, P, b′) be two
problems such that
∑
i∈Pk∗
b′k
∗
i >
∑
i∈Pk∗
bk
∗
i and b
′ℓ
j = b
ℓ
j otherwise. Then, for each i, j ∈ Pk∗ ∪ {0},
fi(A
′)− fi(A) = fj(A
′)− fj(A).
Notice that although this property considers that the individual benefit of firm 0 remain the same,
the aggregated benefits of the rest of the firms in the optimal region increase. This increase in benefit is
generated by the positive externalities of firm 0 in that region. Thus, it seems reasonable for the increase in
benefit to affect firm 0 in the same way as the rest of the firms in the optimal region.
Consider a situation in which a firm in N splits (for instance, each of its plants comes to be considered
as an independent firm). The next property says that the amount obtained by each of the other pre-existing
firms does not change.
Merging-splitting proofness (MSP ): Let A = (0, N, P, b) and A′ = (0, N ′, P ′, b′) be two problems such
that, for some i ∈ N
• N ′ = (N\{i}) ∪ {i1, ..., im}.
• P ′ = {P ′1, ..., P
′
r} where P
′
k = Pk for all k 6= k(i) and P
′
k(i) = (Pk(i)\{i}) ∪ {i
1, ..., im}.
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• b′j = b
k
j for all j ∈ N0\{i} and k ∈ R and b
k(i)
i =
m∑
ℓ=1
b
′k(i)
iℓ
.
Then, fj(A) = fj(A
′) for all j ∈ N0\{i}.
Alternatively, this property can also be motivated by saying that a subset of firms merges into a unique
firm.
In the propositions below we discuss what properties are satisfied by each rule.
Proposition 2. (a) The egalitarian optimal location rule satisfies core selection, monotonicity, symmetry,
and equal treatment inside optimal regions.
(b) The egalitarian optimal location rule does not satisfy no transfer to local firms or merging-splitting
proofness.
Proof. (a) By Theorem 2, EOL coincides with the nucleolus of vA and the nucleolus is always in the core
of vA. Thus, EOL satisfies CS. It is straightforward to check that EOL satisfies SYM .
We prove that EOL satisfies M . Let A′ = (0, N, P, b′) be a problem such that b′ki > b
k
i for some i ∈ N0
and k ∈ R.
Assume that i ∈ N . Notice that necessarily k = k(i). There are three possibilities for k(i):
• k(i) is an optimal region for A. Then, k(i) is the unique optimal region for A′. Therefore, g(A′) > g(A)
and I0(A
′) = I0(A). Then, EOLi(A
′) > EOLi(A).
• k(i) is not an optimal region for either A or A′. Then, EOLi(A
′) = 0 = EOLi(A).
• k(i) is not an optimal region for A but it is for A′. Then, EOLi(A
′) ≥ 0 = EOLi(A).
If i = 0, the following cases need to be analyzed:
• k is an optimal region for A. Then k is the unique optimal region for A′, g(A′) > g(A) and I0(A
′) >
I0(A). Then,
EOL0(A
′) =I0(A
′) +
g(A′)− I0(A
′)
|Pk|+ 1
=I0(A) + (I0(A
′)− I0(A)) +
g(A′)− g(A)
|Pk|+ 1
+
g(A)− I0(A)
|Pk|+ 1
−
I0(A
′)− I0(A)
|Pk|+ 1
=EOL0(A) +
|Pk|(I0(A
′)− I0(A))
|Pk|+ 1
+
g(A′)− g(A)
|Pk|+ 1
>EOL0(A).
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• k is not an optimal region for either A or A′. Then g(A′) = g(A) and I0(A
′) ≥ I0(A). Thus,
EOL0(A
′) =I0(A
′) +
g(A′)− I0(A
′)
|Pk|+ 1
=I0(A) + (I0(A
′)− I0(A)) +
g(A)− I0(A)
|Pk|+ 1
−
I0(A
′)− I0(A)
|Pk|+ 1
=EOL0(A) +
|Pk|(I0(A
′)− I0(A))
|Pk|+ 1
≥EOL0(A).
• k is not an optimal region for A but it is for A′. Then, s(A′) = g(A). Hence, I0(A
′) ≥ g(A). Now,
EOL0(A
′) = I0(A
′) +
g(A′)− I0(A
′)
|Pk|+ 1
≥ I0(A
′) ≥ g(A) ≥ EOL0(A).
Thus, EOL satisfies M .
Finally, we prove that EOL satisfies ETOR. Let A and A′ be two problems fulfilling the conditions
in ETOR. Then k∗ is also an optimal region for A′, g(A′) > g(A) and I0(A
′) = I0(A). Therefore, for all
i ∈ Pk∗ ∪ {0},
EOLi(A
′)− EOLi(A) =
g(A′)− g(A)
|Pk∗ |+ 1
.
Thus, EOL satisfies ETOR.
(b) Consider Example 1. Clearly, EOL does not fulfill NTLF since
tEOL2 (A) = b
2
2 − EOL2(A) = 1− 2 = −1 < 0.
Let A be as in Example 1. Let A′ = (0, N ′, P ′, b′) be a problem such that N ′ = {1, 2, 31, 32}, P =
{{1}, {2, 31, 32}}, b′231 = b
′2
32 = 4, and b
′k
i = b
k
i , otherwise. However,
EOL2(A
′) =
14− 8
4
= 1.5 < 2 = EOL2(A).
Thus, EOL does not satisfy MSP .
Proposition 3. (a) The weighted optimal location rule satisfies core selection, monotonicity, symmetry, no
transfer to local firms, and merging-splitting proofness.
(b) The weighted optimal location rule does not satisfy equal treatment inside optimal regions.
Proof. (a) WOL satisfies CS by Theorem 1. It is straightforward to prove that WOL also satisfies SYM .
We now prove that WOL satisfies M . Let A′ = (0, N, P, b′) be a problem such that b′ki > b
k
i for some
i ∈ N0 and k ∈ R.
Let i ∈ N . Notice that necessarily k = k(i). There are three possibilities for k(i):
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• k(i) is an optimal region for A. Then, k(i) is the unique optimal region for A′. Therefore, g(A′) > g(A)
and I0(A
′) = I0(A). Then,
WOLi(A
′) =
b′k
∗
i∑
j∈Pk∗
b′k
∗
j
(g(A′)− I0(A
′)) ≥
bk
∗
i∑
j∈Pk∗
bk
∗
j
(g(A)− I0(A)) =WOLi(A).
• k(i) is not an optimal region for either A or A′. Then, WOLi(A
′) = 0 = WOLi(A).
• k(i) is not an optimal region for A but it is for A′. Then, WOLi(A
′) ≥ 0 =WOLi(A).
If i = 0, WOL0(A
′) = I0(A
′) ≥ I0(A) =WOL0(A). Therefore, WOL satisfies M .
We prove thatWOL satisfies NTLF . Let k∗ be an optimal region. If k∗ is not unique, thenWOLi(A) =
0, for all i ∈ N . Hence tWOLi (A) = b
k∗
i ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N .
Now consider that k∗ is unique. For all i ∈ Pk∗ ,
tWOLi (A) = b
k∗
i −
bk
∗
i∑
j∈Pk∗
bk
∗
j
(g(A)− I0(A)) = b
k∗
i

1− g(A)− I0(A)∑
j∈Pk∗
bk
∗
j

 .
Let i ∈ Pk∗ . If b
k∗
i = 0, then t
WOL
i (A) = 0. Assume that b
k∗
i > 0. Thus,
tWOLi (A) ≥ 0⇔1−
g(A)− I0(A)∑
j∈Pk∗
bk
∗
j
≥ 0
⇔
∑
j∈Pk∗
bk
∗
j ≥ g(A)− I0(A)
⇔I0(A) ≥ g(A)−
∑
j∈Pk∗
bk
∗
j = b
k∗
0 ,
which always holds. Thus, WOL satisfies NTLF .
We now prove that WOL satisfies MSP . Let i ∈ N and A′ fulfilling the conditions in MSP . Let k∗ be
an optimal region for A. If k∗ is not unique, WOLj(A
′) = 0 = WOLj(A), for all j ∈ N0\{i}.
Now assume that k∗ is unique. Notice that k∗ is an optimal region for A′. Moreover, g(A′) = g(A) and
I0(A) = I0(A
′). Then, for all j ∈ Pk∗\{i},
WOLj(A
′) =
b′k
∗
j∑
ℓ∈P ′
k∗
b′k
∗
ℓ
(g(A′)− I0(A
′)) =
bk
∗
j∑
ℓ∈Pk∗
bk
∗
ℓ
(g(A)− I0(A)) =WOLj(A).
Since WOLj(A
′) = 0 = WOLj(A), for all j ∈ N0\Pk∗ , WOL satisfies MSP .
(b) Again, consider the problem introduced in Example 1. Now let A′ = (0, N, P, b′) be a problem such
that b′22 = 4. Note that A and A
′ fulfill the conditions of ETOR. Since WOL(A′) = (8, 0, 3, 6) it can be
deduced that WOL does not satisfy ETOR.
We now provide an axiomatic characterization for the EOL rule with core selection and equal treatment
inside optimal regions.
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Theorem 5. The egalitarian optimal location rule is the only rule that satisfies core selection and equal
treatment inside optimal regions.
Proof. By Proposition 2, EOL satisfies CS and ETOR.
We now prove uniqueness. Let f be a rule satisfying both properties. Assume that A has several optimal
regions. Since the core has a single element and f satisfies CS it is obvious that f coincides with EOL.
Assume that A has a unique optimal region k∗. We consider two cases.
• I0(A) = s(A). There exists ℓ ∈ R\{k
∗} such that I0(A) =
∑
i∈Pℓ∪{0}
bℓi . Define A
1 = (0, N, P, b1) such
that
∑
i∈Pk∗
b1k
∗
i = s(A)− b
k∗
0 and b
1k
j = b
k
j , otherwise.
In A1 there are at least two optimal regions: k∗ and ℓ. Moreover, g(A1) = I0(A). By Theorem 1, the
core of vA
1
has a single element (I0(A), 0, ..., 0). By CS f(A
1) = (I0(A), 0, ..., 0).
Since A and A1 fulfill the conditions of ETOR, we have that for each i, j ∈ Pk∗ ∪ {0},
fi(A)− fi(A
1) = fj(A)− fj(A
1).
Fix i ∈ Pk∗ ∪ {0}, then
(|Pk∗ |+ 1)(fi(A)− fi(A
1)) =
∑
j∈Pk∗∪{0}
(fj(A)− fj(A
1))
=g(A)− g(A1)
=g(A)− I0(A)
⇒ fi(A) = fi(A
1) +
g(A)− I0(A)
|Pk∗ |+ 1
.
Then f coincides with EOL on Pk∗∪{0}. Since f satisfies CS and Theorem 1 it follows that fi(A) = 0
for all i ∈ N\Pk∗ . Hence f coincides with EOL on N\Pk∗ .
• I0(A) = b
k∗
0 . Let A
2 = (0, N, P, b2) be a problem such that b2k
∗
i = 0, for all i ∈ Pk∗ and b
2k
j = b
k
j ,
otherwise. Note that k∗ is also the unique optimal region for A2, g(A2) = I0(A) and b
2k∗
i = 0, for all
i ∈ Pk∗ . By Theorem 1 and CS f(A
2) = (I0(A), 0, ..., 0).
Since A and A2 also fulfill the conditions of ETOR, it can be concluded using arguments similar to
those used in the previous case that f coincides with EOL.
Remark 1. The properties used in Theorem 5 are independent.
The WOL rule satisfies CS but not ETOR.
The rule f given by fi(A) =
g(A)
n+ 1
, ∀i ∈ N0 satisfies ETOR but not CS.
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In the next theorem we characterize the rules that satisfy core selection and merging-splitting proofness.
These rules have a nice interpretation. Firm 0 receives I0(A) for sure. Moreover firm 0 receives an extra
transfer x0(A) from firms in the optimal region k
∗. The transfer of each firm located in region k∗ is
proportional to b.
Theorem 6. A rule f satisfies core selection and merging-splitting proofness if and only if for each A there
is x0(A) ∈ [0, g(A)− I0(A)] such that
fi(A) =


I0(A) + x0(A), if i = 0
bk
∗
i∑
j∈Pk∗
bk
∗
j
(g(A)− I0(A)− x0(A)), if i ∈ Pk∗
0, otherwise.
Proof. It is straightforward to prove that any rule such as in the statement of this theorem satisfies the two
properties.
Let f be a rule satisfying CS and MSP . We prove that f also satisfies SYM . Let i, j ∈ Pk as in the
definition of SYM . Consider the following problems:
• Aip obtained from A by splitting firm i into two, p1 and p2, with benefit b
k
p1
= bkp2 =
bki
2
.
• Aip,jq obtained from Aip by splitting firm j into two, q1 and q2 with benefit b
k
q1
= bkq2 =
bki
2
.
• Ajp obtained from A by splitting firm j into two, p1 and p2, with benefit b
k
p1
= bkp2 =
bki
2
.
• Ajp,iq obtained from Ajp by splitting firm i into two, q1 and q2 with benefit b
k
q1
= bkq2 =
bki
2
.
Since the sequence of problems A, Aip and Aip,jq is under the hypothesis of MSP , it follows that
fi(A) = fp1(A
ip) + fp2(A
ip) = fp1(A
ip,jq) + fp2(A
ip,jq).
Since the sequence of problems A, Ajp, and Ajp,iq is under the hypothesis of MSP it follows that
fj(A) = fp1(A
jp) + fp2(A
jp) = fp1(A
jp,iq) + fp2(A
jp,iq).
Since the problems Aip,jq and Ajp,iq coincide, it follows that fi(A) = fj(A). Hence, f satisfies SYM .
Assume that A has several optimal regions. Since f satisfies CS and Theorem 1 it can be deduced that
f(A) = (g(A), 0, ..., 0). Thus, x0(A) = g(A)− I0(A).
Now assume that A has a unique optimal region k∗. Also assume, without loss of generality, that
Pk∗ = {1, ..., p}.
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Since f satisfies CS, by Theorem 1 it can be deduced that
f(A) = (I0(A) + x0, x1, ..., xp, 0, ..., 0)
where 0 ≤ xi ≤ g(A)− I0(A) for each i = 0, 1, ..., p.
Define x0(A) = x0. For any ε > 0, it is possible to find {n
ε
i}i∈Pk∗ , b
ε, and {bεi}i∈Pk∗ such that
• bε ∈ R and bε ≤ ε.
• For each i ∈ Pk∗ , n
ε
i ∈ N, 0 ≤ b
ε
i ≤ b
ε and bk
∗
i = n
ε
i b
ε + bεi .
For every h = 1, ..., p, let Ah be the problem obtained from A by splitting each firm i = 1, ..., h into
nεi + 1 firms. The first n
ε
i firms with b
hk∗
iℓ
= bε and firm nεi + 1 with b
hk∗
i
nε
i
+1 = b
ε
i .
Formally, for each h = 1, ..., p, let Ah = (0, Nh, Ph, bh) be a problem such that
• Nh = (N\{1, ..., h}) ∪
(
∪hi=1{i
1, ..., in
ε
i+1}
)
.
• Ph = {Ph1 , ..., P
h
r } where P
h
k∗ = (Pk∗\{1, ..., h}) ∪
(
∪hi=1{i
1, ..., in
ε
i+1}
)
and Phk = Pk for all k 6= k
∗.
• bhkj = b
k
j , for all j ∈ N\{1, ..., h} and k ∈ R. Given i ∈ {1, ..., h} and ℓ = 1, ..., n
ε
i + 1, b
hk
iℓ
= 0 if
k 6= k∗, bhk
∗
iℓ
= bε if ℓ = 1, ..., nεi and b
hk∗
iℓ
= bεi if ℓ = n
ε
i + 1.
Notice that in the sequence of problem A → A1 → · · · → Ap it is possible to apply MSP to each pair
of consecutive problems.
For A and A1,
fi(A) = fi(A
1), ∀i ∈ N0\{1} and
f1(A) =
nε1+1∑
ℓ=1
f1ℓ(A
1).
For A1 and A2,
fi(A
1) = fi(A
2), ∀i ∈ N0\{1, 2},
f1ℓ(A
1) = f1ℓ(A
2), ∀ℓ = 1, ..., nε1 + 1 and
f2(A
1) =
nε2+1∑
ℓ=1
f2ℓ(A
2).
Iterating the previous argument, the following is obtained for Ap−1 and Ap,
fi(A
p−1) = fi(A
p), ∀i ∈ N0\Pk∗ ,
fiℓ(A
p−1) = fiℓ(A
p), ∀i = 1, ..., p− 1, ℓ = 1, ..., nεi + 1 and
23
fp(A
p−1) =
nεp+1∑
ℓ=1
fpℓ(A
p).
Therefore,
f1(A) =
nε1+1∑
ℓ=1
f1ℓ(A
1) =
nε1+1∑
ℓ=1
f1ℓ(A
2) = · · · =
nε1+1∑
ℓ=1
f1ℓ(A
p),
f2(A) = f2(A
1) =
nε2+1∑
ℓ=1
f2ℓ(A
2) = · · · =
nε2+1∑
ℓ=1
f2ℓ(A
p),
·
·
·
fp(A) = fp(A
1) = · · · = fp(A
p−1) =
nεp+1∑
ℓ=1
fpℓ(A
p).
From these equations and SYM , it can be concluded that, for any i ∈ Pk∗ ,
fi(A) =
nεi+1∑
ℓ=1
fiℓ(A
p) =
nεi∑
ℓ=1
fiℓ(A
p) + f
i
nε
i
+1(Ap) = nεifi1(A
p) + f
i
nε
i
+1(Ap).
Notice also that fi1(A
p) = fj1(A
p), for all i, j ∈ Pk∗ . Then denote x
ε = fi1(A
p) and xεi = fin
ε
i
+1(Ap).
Thus, ∀i ∈ P ∗k ,
fi(A) = n
ε
ix
ε + xεi .
Fix i ∈ Pk∗ . Let A
α be the problem obtained from Ap by splitting firm i1 into two firms: α1 with
bαk
∗
α1
= bεi and α
2 with bαk
∗
α2
= bε − bεi . By MSP and because f is non-negative (by CS),
fα1(A
α) ≤ fα1(A
α) + fα2(A
α) = fi1(A
p) = xε.
Moreover, xεi = finε1+1(A
p) = f
i
nε1+1
(Aα) = fα1(A
α). Hence, 0 ≤ xεi ≤ x
ε, for all i ∈ Pk∗ .
Since
g(A) = f0(A) +
∑
j∈Pk∗
fj(A) = I0(A) + x0 +
∑
j∈Pk∗
nεjx
ε +
∑
j∈Pk∗
xεj
and 0 ≤ xεj ≤ x
ε for all j ∈ Pk∗ , it can be deduced that
g(A) ≥ I0(A) + x0 +
∑
j∈Pk∗
nεjx
ε (1)
and
g(A) ≤ I0(A) + x0 +
∑
j∈Pk∗
(nεj + 1)x
ε. (2)
By (1),
xε ≤
g(A)− I0(A)− x0∑
j∈Pk∗
nεj
=
(g(A)− I0(A)− x0)b
ε∑
j∈Pk∗
(bk
∗
j − b
ε
j)
.
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Therefore, for all i ∈ Pk∗ ,
fi(A) =n
ε
ix
ε + xεi ≤ (n
ε
i + 1)x
ε
≤(nεi + 1)

 (g(A)− I0(A)− x0)bε∑
j∈Pk∗
(bk
∗
j − b
ε
j)


=
bk
∗
i − b
ε
i + b
ε∑
j∈Pk∗
(bk
∗
j − b
ε
j)
(g(A)− I0(A)− x0).
By (2),
xε ≥
g(A)− I0(A)− x0∑
j∈Pk∗
(nεi + 1)
=
(g(A)− I0(A)− x0)b
ε
pbε +
∑
j∈Pk∗
(bk
∗
j − b
ε
j)
.
Therefore, for all i ∈ Pk∗ ,
fi(A) =n
ε
ix
ε + xεi ≥ n
ε
ix
ε
≥nεi

 (g(A)− I0(A)− x0)bε
pbε +
∑
j∈Pk∗
(bk
∗
j − b
ε
j)


=
bk
∗
i − b
ε
i
pbε +
∑
j∈Pk∗
(bk
∗
j − b
ε
j)
(g(A)− I0(A)− x0).
Then, for all i ∈ Pk∗ ,
bk
∗
i − b
ε
i
pbε +
∑
j∈Pk∗
(bk
∗
j − b
ε
j)
(g(A)− I0(A)− x0) ≤ fi(A) ≤
bk
∗
i − b
ε
i + b
ε∑
j∈Pk∗
(bk
∗
j − b
ε
j)
(g(A)− I0(A)− x0).
Taking the limit when ε tends to zero in the previous inequality, it is obtained that for all i ∈ Pk∗ ,
bk
∗
i∑
j∈Pk∗
(bk
∗
j )
(g(A)− I0(A)− x0) ≤ fi(A) ≤
bk
∗
i∑
j∈Pk∗
(bk
∗
j )
(g(A)− I0(A)− x0).
Hence,
fi(A) =
bk
∗
i∑
j∈Pk∗
bk
∗
j
(g(A)− I0(A)− x0)
and the desired expression is obtained.
Remark 2. The properties used in Theorem 6 are independent.
The EOL rule satisfies CS but not MSP .
The rule f given by
fi(A) =


I0(A), if i = 0
b
k(i)
i∑
j∈N
b
k(j)
j
(g(A)− I0(A)), if i ∈ N
satisfies MSP but not CS.
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The next corollary of Theorem 6 provides a characterization of the WOL rule.
Corollary 1. Of all the rules satisfying core selection and merging-splitting proofness, the weighted optimal
location rule is the one that minimizes transfers to firm 0.
The proof of this corollary is obvious because WOL coincides with the rule characterized in Theorem 6
when x0(A) = 0 for all A.
6. Concluding remarks
We introduce a new type of location problem that considers a widely studied economic phenomenon:
Agglomeration economies. Once the optimal region has been determined, the main issue is to provide an
appropriate compensation scheme for the firms involved in the problem. We analyze this problem using
cooperative game theory. We first prove that the core is non empty and characterize all the allocations
in the core. We also consider a rule, called the egalitarian optimal location rule, which always selects an
element in the core. We also prove that this rule can be obtained as the nucleolus or the τ -value of the
cooperative game. We provide an axiomatic characterization for this rule.
We argue that the egalitarian optimal location rule has some shortcomings (some firms already located
in the optimal region could receive transfers). Thus we consider a new rule called the weighted optimal
location rule. That rule is also characterized.
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